lunedì 4 settembre 2017

Help wanted .

For the displaced persone of the south Blue Nile we need your help if you can donate:-

through MasterCard No.
5333171036379549
Valid thru 11/21
IBAN . IT85Z0760105138208118608119
Abdelazim Abdella  first name
Gomaa Kheer Alsied last name.




giovedì 28 aprile 2016

طلاب جامعة النيلين يخرجون الى الشوارع شاهرين الهتاف احتجاجاً على مقتل طالب الأهلية
طلاب جامعة النيلين يخرجون الى الشوارع شاهرين الهتاف احتجاجاً على مقتل طالب الأهلية


04-27-2016 04:44 PM
بعد فعالية ثورية أقامها طلاب حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي اليوم الاربعاء الموافق 27 /4 /2016 احتجاجاً على اغتيال طالب بجامعة كردفان على أيدي اجهزة الامن بمدينة الابيض، وقد تجمع الطلاب في مخاطبة حاشدة حيث ترحم متحدث الرابطة علي روح الشهيد ابوبكر وحث الطلاب الي ضرورة الخروج الى الشوارع لاسقاط نظام المؤتمر الوطني والاقتصاص من القتلة.

وبمجرد سماع خبر استشهاد طالب جامعة الاهليه "محمد الصادق" انضم الطلاب البعثين وعدد من الطلاب الديمقراطين لفعالية الطلاب الاتحاديين، ومنها الى كلية الاداب وبعدها الى ميدان "جاكسون" مع الطلاب الديمقراطيين والطلاب الاتحاديين وعلت هتافات الطلاب:
* مقتل طالب مقتل أُمّه ..
* يسقط يسقط حكم العسكر ..
* وهتافات أخرى ملئت سماء النيلين.

venerdì 28 novembre 2014

Destroy THE SUDAN.

Tribal Clashes Inflict Heavy Toll


By REUTERSNOV. 27, 2014

At least 133 people have been killed and more than 100 wounded in clashes between two groups belonging to an Arab tribe in West Kordofan State, a tribal leader said Thursday. The clashes between the Awlad Omran and Al-Ziyoud groups of the Arab Mesiria tribe began with a dispute over land, said Mukhtar Babo Nimr, the leader of the tribe. West Kordofan is the main oil-producing state in Sudan, and it borders the turbulent Darfur region and the nation of South Sudan. Arab tribes, many of which were armed by the Sudanese government to help end an insurgency by mainly non-Arab rebels in Darfur, have turned their guns against one another in a surge of conflict over resources.

giovedì 27 novembre 2014

Storia del - THE SUDAN -

Il Sudan, paese convertitosi all’islam in seguito all’invasione araba avvenuta nel IX secolo, subì da prima la presenza militare egiziana (1820 – 1882) e successivamente l’influenza coloniale inglese, che cercò di impedire militarmente le aspirazioni di autonomia del popolo sudanese. Nel 1885 l’Inghilterra, perso il controllo della capitale Kartoum, fu costretta a lasciare il paese, che riconquistò successivamente nel 1898. A partire dal 1936 il Sudan fu scosso da lotte interne che videro fronteggiarsi i sostenitori dell'annessione all'Egitto e gli indipendentisti, grazie ai quali divenne indipendente nel gennaio del 1956. La storia del Sudan è stata segnata da violenti conflitti interni che hanno visto fronteggiarsi la popolazione arabo-musulmana del Nord, detentrice da sempre del potere politico-militare, e le popolazioni animiste e cristiane del Sud. Gli equilibri interni furono inoltre minati dal susseguirsi di eventi cruenti. Le elezioni del marzo 1958 diedero vita ad un governo di coalizione che dopo pochi mesi fu costretto a lasciare il potere alla dittatura militare del generale Ibrahim Abbud, rovesciata successivamente nel 1964. Nel 1969 un nuovo colpo di Stato ha assegnò i pieni poteri al Consiglio Rivoluzionario del colonnello Jaafar el-Nimeiry, che proclamò la Repubblica Democratica del Sudan. Nonostante il pugno forte che caratterizzo questo periodo storico i governi che si susseguirono non furono mai in grado di stabilire un’intesa con la guerriglia che controllava la parte meridionale del Paese, e proprio per questo motivo non fu in grado di dotare il Sudan di una Costituzione federale. La guerra civile, prolungatasi per quasi mezzo secolo, ha causato 2 milioni di morti e 4 milioni di profughi, diventando la più lunga e sanguinosa guerra dell'Africa. Tra il 1985 ed 1989 il potere viene preso e perso per ben tre volte: il 6 maggio 1985 Abdel R. Sewar el Dahb rovescia il presedente Jafar el Nimeiry; il 6 maggio 1986 sale al potere Ahmed Ali el Mirfhamiun; il 30 giugno 1989, con un ennesimo colpo di stato, si insedia Omar Hassan Ahmed al Bashir. E sarà proprio il regime del generale golpista che giuderà il paese fino ai nostri giorni. Durante gli anni 80 e 90 le autorità di Kartoum attuarono una politica di tipo islamico fondamentalista che portò il Paese all’isolamento internazionale. Malgrado lo sforzo militare, alla fine del 1995 i separatisti del sud sferrarono una vittoriosa offensiva militare. Nello stesso anno il regime sudanese, accusato di essere coinvolto nell'attentato al presidente egiziano Mubarak, si trovò a fronteggiare le truppe del Cairo in scontri armati alla frontiera. Nel 1999 fu annunciato una tregua unilaterale con i ribelli sud, e l’anno successivo, dopo aver sciolto il parlamento, fu dichiarato lo stato d'emergenza. Le cause del conflitto tra Khartoum e gli indipendentisti del Sud, organizzati nell'Esercito di Liberazione Popolare (SPLA), vanno ricercate in primo luogo nelle diverse radici etniche, religiose, culturali e linguistiche delle due popolazioni. Non va comunque dimenticato l’aspetto economico della controversia. Il Sud si trova in una posizione geograficamente più favorevole caratterizzata:terreni fertili, abbondanza d’acqua dovuta alla presenza del Nilo, risorse petrolifere. L’inizio del nuovo millennio è stato però caratterizzato da una fase di moderato ottimismo, lasciando uno spiraglio a quelle speranza di pace che, in questo continente, è una merce così rara e preziosa, pagata sicuramente a caro prezzo. Con il patrocinio di Italia, Gran Bretagna, Norvegia e soprattutto Stati Uniti, nel 2002 viene iniziata una trattativa tra Kartoum e il SPLA. Il 9 gennaio del 2005 viene firmato un accordo di pace, nel quale non viene presa in considerazione la crisi del Darfur, che prevede un’ampia autonomia per il Sud e la ripartizione delle risorse e dei poteri. Nel trattato è stato anche stabilito che un periodo di transizione, che si concluderà nel 2011, le popolazioni cristiano-animiste del Sud decideranno, attraverso un referendum, se diventare una Regione autonoma all’interno di uno stato federale o dare vita ad uno stato indipendente. Intanto, dalla seconda metà del 2005 dovranno essere impiegati 10.000 Caschi Blu per vigilare gli accordi di pace e sulle sanzioni riguardanti l’estrazione del petrolio nella regione. Ma i problemi del Sudan non si fermano qui. La crisi del Darfur, definita da tutti come un vero e proprio genocidio, è stata al centro della scena politico-militare Sudanese per tutto il 2004. Tutto nasce nel febbraio 2003, quando i ribelli del Darfur Liberation Army (DLA) proclamarono l’indipendenza di una zona della regione occidentale del Darfur, ribellandosi alle violenze perpetrate dalle milizie paramilitari arabe Janjaweed armate dal governo del generale al Bashir. Entrambe le parti sono di religione mussulmana e di stesso ceppo etnico-colturale, ma dedite ad attività differenti: agricoltori i primi, nomadi e pastori i secondi. Ed è proprio nel controllo delle terre e delle risorse d’acqua che va ricercato il motivo centrale del conflitto. L’8 aprile 2004 in Ciad, la comunità internazionale, rea di non aver mai intrapreso azioni volte alla soluzione del problema, è riuscita ad ottenere un cessate il fuoco e ha dato inizio ai primi colloqui di pace svoltisi ad Addis Abeba. Questo comunque non ha fatto in modo che i soprusi ai danni della popolazione civile continuassero, nonostante l’operazione di peacekeeping lanciata dall’Unione Africana (Ciad, Kenya, Ruanda, Senegal, Sudafrica). Anche se spostati in Nigeria i negoziati continuano e l’ONU ha minacciato Kartoum di sanzioni economiche. Intanto la Corte Penale Internazionale ha avviato un’indagine intesa ad identificare le responsabilità per la catastrofe e per i crimini contro l’umanità perpetrati nel paese e che hanno causato più di 2.000.000 di sfollati e circa 300.000 vittime. La cosa non sarà facile visto che una commissione d’inchiesta dell’ONU ha già assolto il governo di Kartoum per “non aver perseguito una politica di genocidio” e che il Tribunale Internazionale ha dichiarato che “nessun cittadino verrà giudicato da una corte straniera”. Non ultimo è quanto la le potenzialità di produzione petrolifera del paese influenzeranno gli interessi internazionali, che vedono in prima linea attori come Cina, Stati Uniti, Inghilterra, Francia e Russia.

mercoledì 26 novembre 2014

slavery is still inthe united states of evel

The white police man had been free but the NEGER died slavery is still in the UNITED STATES OF EVEL


Slavery in the United States was the legal institution of chattel slavery that existed in the United States of America in the 18th and 19th centuries. Slavery had been practiced in British North America from early colonial days, and was recognized in the Thirteen Colonies at the time of the Declaration of Independence in 1776. When the United States was founded, even though some free persons of color were present, the status of slave was largely coincident with being of African descent, creating a system and legacy in which race played an influential role. After the Revolutionary War, abolitionist laws and sentiment gradually spread in the Northern states, while the rapid expansion of the cotton industry from 1800 led to the Southern states strongly identifying with slavery, and attempting to extend it into the new Western territories. The United States was polarized by slavery into slave and free states along the Mason-Dixon Line, which separated Maryland (slave) and Pennsylvania (free).




Although the international slave trade was prohibited from 1808, internal slave-trading continued, and the slave population would eventually peak at four million before abolition.[1][2]



As the West opened up, the Southern states believed they needed to keep a balance between the numbers of slave and free states, in order to maintain a balance of power in Congress. The new territories acquired from Britain, France and Mexico were the subject of major political compromises. By 1850, the newly rich cotton-growing South was threatening to secede from the Union, and tensions continued to rise. With church ministers under pressure to preach slavery doctrine conforming to the local politics, the Baptist and Methodist churches split into regional organizations. When Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 election on a platform of no new slave states, the South finally broke away to form the Confederacy. This marked the start of the Civil War, which caused a huge disruption of the slave economy, with many slaves either escaping or being liberated by the Union armies. The war effectively ended slavery, before the Thirteenth Amendment (December 1865) formally outlawed the institution throughout the United States.



lunedì 24 novembre 2014

END OF THE MAHADIST RULE IN SUDAN.

Sudan History - The Mahdist rule (1885-1899)


The Mahdiyah did not impose Islamic laws. The new ruler's aim was more political than anything else. This was evident in the animosity he showed towards existing Muslims and locals who did not show loyalty to his system and rule. He authorised the burning of lists of pedigrees and books of law and theology as well as destruction of Mosques in the north and east of Sudan. The Mahdi maintained that his movement was not a religious order that could be accepted or rejected at will, but that it was a universal regime, which challenged man to join or to be destroyed.

Originally, the Mahdiyah was a jihad state, run like a military camp. Courts enforced the regime's grip on power and the Mahdi's precepts, which had the force of law. Six months after the fall of Khartoum, the Mahdi died of typhus, and after a power struggle amongst his deputies, Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, with the help primarily of the Baqqara Arabs of western Sudan, overcame the opposition of the others and emerged as unchallenged leader of the Mahdiyah. After consolidating his power, Abdallahi ibn Muhammad assumed the title of Khalifa of the Mahdi, instituted an administration, and appointed Ansar as emirs over each of the several provinces.



Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the Mahdiyah period, largely because of the Khalifa's brutal methods to extend his rule throughout the country. In 1887, a 60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia, penetrating as far as Gondar. In March 1889, king Yohannes IV of Ethiopia, marched on Metemma; however, after Yohannes fell in battle, the Ethiopian forces withdrew. Abd ar Rahman an Nujumi, the Khalifa's general, attempted an invasion of Egypt in 1889, but British-led Egyptian troops defeated the Ansar at Tushkah. The failure of the Egyptian invasion broke the spell of the Ansar's invincibility. The Belgians prevented the Mahdi's men from conquering Equatoria, and in 1893, the Italians repelled an Ansar attack at Akordat and forced the Ansar to withdraw from Ethiopia.

sabato 22 novembre 2014

Hands up from women and children.

Home

Comment & Analysis Friday 21 November 2014

The UNAMID internal report on mass rape in Tabit.

ArticleComments (3). Email PrintSave

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What UNAMID really said about their investigation of mass sexual assaults on Tabit: The internal report on what investigators found



By Eric Reeves



November 20, 2014 - On November 12, 2014 Agence France-Presse reported exclusively on the real findings of the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) investigation of mass sexual violence at Tabit town, North Darfur. This must be distinguished from the publicly released document of November 10 that concludes by saying of Tabit:

Village community leaders reiterated to UNAMID that they coexist peacefully with local military authorities in the area. The team also interviewed the local Sudanese Armed Forces Commander.



None of those interviewed confirmed that any incident of rape took place in Tabit on the day of that media report. The team neither found any evidence nor received any information regarding the media allegations during the period in question. (UNAMID press release, 10 November 2014)



Agence France-Presse did not release the entire document; it did, however, reach the appropriate conclusions:

The report by the joint UN-AU mission in Darfur suggests that a visit by a team of monitors to the village of Tabit was carefully prepared by the Sudanese military to prevent witnesses from coming forward. During the team visit, there was a heavy presence of Sudanese soldiers who followed the monitors and recorded interviews with the villagers, according to the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) report obtained by AFP.



"The behavior and responses of interviewees indicated an environment of fear and intimidation," said the report on the Sunday visit. "Some of the sub-teams had to ask the military personnel to stop following them and also asked them to allow the conduction of interviews in some privacy," it added. The report quoted a villager in Tabit who said the soldiers had told the community "not to provide information to UNAMID" and that "reportedly a committee was formed to interact" with the fact-finding mission. (AFP, 12 November 2014
http://news.yahoo.com/sudan-military-sought-intimidate-during-mass-rape-probe-200354793.html)



The document, in its entirety, has been leaked further and appears below. Khartoum is reportedly furious at the leak from within UNAMID and understandably so. The disparity between what was said publicly seemed to end the "Tabit issue" and obviate any further investigation; what is reported privately in the document below makes clear this is not so. The document should also give considerable pause to anyone who has credited the report commissioned by Ban Ki-moon that exonerates UNAMID’s cover-ups and failures to notify appropriate personnel of evidence of atrocity crimes. Even so the report found at least five instances in which UNAMID did not report or report adequately on such crimes. To which the Secretary General found it sufficient to issue a statement through his spokesman declaring:



A review, initiated by the Secretary-General, was conducted into recent allegations that the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) intentionally sought to cover up crimes against civilians and peacekeepers. The Review Team examined all the material related to 16 incidents, which were the basis of these allegations. It also interviewed former and current staff in UNAMID and at UN Headquarters. The Review Team did not find any evidence to support these allegations. (Statement attributable to the spokesman for the Secretary-General, 29 October 2014)



But in fact what was released shows that UNAMID, on a number of occasions, deliberately withheld critical information from the UN and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This recent UN report on UNAMID’s performance—coming in the waking of authoritative accusations of malfeasance, negligence, and mendacity by Aicha Elbasri, former UNAMID spokeswoman—has not been released publicly, but Colum Lynch of Foreign Policy has posted the text in connection with his current analysis of the findings; Lynch broke the original story in Foreign Policy in which Ms. Elbasri’s account of UNAMID’s deliberate under-reporting and non-reporting of serious crimes was presented in very considerable and persuasive detail.



The UNAMID press release concerning Tabit also does not comport well with what Radio Dabanga reported the following day:

A delegation of five members of the Coordination Committee of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Darfur had also visited the village: “We just returned from Tabit on Friday [November 7] with a delegation, after two days of investigation. There we met 60 women and girls, we looked into their eyes while they told us they were raped by soldiers from 8 pm [on Friday, October 31] until 5:00am [on Saturday, November 1]. (Radio Dabanga [Tabit] 11 November 2014; full text of this crucial dispatch appears at https://www.radiodabanga.org/node/83429)



More importantly, the public press release by UNAMID gives no sense of what investigators actually encountered at Tabit—that was clearly to have remained an internal matter. This in itself is merely an extension of the Mission’s reflexive defensiveness in the face of continuing failures to protect civilians or to investigate atrocity crimes targeting civilians.



Here is the internal UNAMID document in its entirety as I have received it today (20 November 2014):



African Union - United Nations UNAMID

Tabit Integrated Field Mission

09/11/2014



I. Introduction

On 3 November 2014, Radio Dabanga reported that “More than 200 women and girls were collectively raped in their village on Friday 31 October 2014 evening, reportedly by Sudanese soldiers belonging to a military garrison south of El Fasher in North Darfur. 80 of the victims were schoolgirls, 105 were unmarried girls. The other victims were married women. The residents of Tabit have not been able yet to transfer the wounded to other towns or medical centers.



The number of women allegedly raped in Tabit was quite high. Sexual violence in Darfur, since the start of conflict (2003), is a key issue. However, it can be said that since the early days of conflict, allegation of such massive rapes were not received. This allegation was a serious cause of concern for UNAMID as well as for international community because even during the intense fighting between GoS forces and SLA/MM and JEM in December 2010 and January 2011, such violations were not reported. The Rapid Support Force (RSF) activities in South and North Darfur created a lot of concerns and allegations of violations were raised. However, even during RSF actions, such heinous and massive allegations were not received.



These concerns led to a UNAMID verification attempt via Shangil Tobaya team-site on 4 November 2014. This verification field mission was denied access outside Tabit by GoS military on the pretext of not obtaining permission from GoS authorities.



On 05 November 2014, SN organized a joint visit to Zam Zam IDPs camp including HRS, RoL, Humanitarian Section, Child Protection Unit, CAS and UNPoL. The purpose of the visit was to verify the information received that there were new arrivals in the camp from Tabit area, following an alleged mass rape of about 200 girls which may have occurred in that area. The team interacted with the Omda of Tabit Mr. ADAM and the Chief of Omdas of Zam Zam Mr. ALI ISHAG. According to them, there is no new arrivals in the camp and the situation is normal.



UNAMID SN then intensified its engagement with GoS authorities in El-Fasher to gain access to Tabit via El-Fasher route. The access was achieved on 9 November 2014.



II. Particulars

Date: 9 November 2014?Coordinates of Tabit: (N 13018’00” E 25005’00”)



Distance: About 48/50 km (Vehicle speedometer reading, end and start: 77679 – 77622 = 57. The vehicle was used for moving inside the town; also came to town after departure to conduct interview with SAF commander).



Time: The field mission arrived in Tabit at 1316 hours, left at 1618 hours



Population: The number of population is not certain. Different estimates provided by different interlocutors. The maximum was about 7/8 thousands individuals.



Tribes: Not exact numbers or figures. But it was mentioned that Fur (Basinga), Tama and Tunjur are the main tribes.



III. Methodology of information collection



The UNAMID field mission was an integrated type; 18 representatives from different sections/units participated in the mission; most of the team was from Sector North with some from HQ.



Due to shortage of time, as well as the issue of GoS curfew after 1600 hours, the team was divided into sub-teams to facilitate wide reach and to obtain higher quantity of interviews. It was decided to seek out and conduct interviews with citizens, students, native administrators, females, persons present in Tabit market, students and other groups. It was also decided to attempt to trace the family, which was allegedly detained by SAF and also to meet with the SAF commander in the end of field interviews.



The interviews were conducted in group as well as isolation format. Attempts were made to conduct the interview in confidential setting but it was not always possible. The sub-teams introduced themselves and the explained the purpose and objective of the mission; consent were sought before the interviews and the interviewees were given time to ask question or pose comments.



Beside access issue, significant challenges were faced on the ground during verification exercise. The SAF personnel were present in sizable numbers – in uniform and civil clothing – in Tabit. They followed the sub-teams during the verification exercise. Some of the sub-teams reported the interviews being captured on recording devices (mobile phone) by the SAF members. The behavior and responses of interviewees indicated an environment of fear and intimidation. Some of the sub-teams had to ask the military personnel to stop following them and also asked them to allow the conduction of interviews in some privacy.



The integrated mission was launched suddenly. A short debriefing was done but the lack of time to properly organize created logistical and substantive challenges. The format or types of interviewing tools were not finalized. An agreed set of questions were not developed and deployed. Each sub-team had to rely on their own previous experience and expertise to find the information required.



The issue of GoS curfew after 1600 hours on the movement of UNAMID convoys also limited the time available at the verification site.



IV. Consolidated Assessment

The sub-teams attempted verification in different parts of Tabit town. A consolidated assessment of the situation, issues and events are as follows:



Security

• The overall security situation was observed to be okay.

• The area is under robust control of GoS military forces.



Environment during mission

• During the verification exercise, there were a high number of military personnel, in civil clothing and in uniform present in the Tabit village.

• The sub-teams also observed a small number of adult population (male and females) available in the town. It was informed that a lot of people go out to farms in the morning but compared to the SAF personnel numbers present, the low number of town people was quite conspicuous.

• The public was shy to openly discuss the allegation of mass rape in Tabit. An environment of fear and silence prevailed. A number of interviewees refused to interact or responded that they were unaware of the incident.

• One of the professional (teacher) in Tabit informed UNAMID that SAF had previously informed community not to provide information to UNAMID forthcoming field mission. Reportedly a committee was formed to interact with UNAMID field mission.

• The military personnel attempted to follow each sub-team and to remain present during interviews. There were complaints of recording and picture taking of the sub-teams during interviews by military personnel.

• One sub-team observed that local population consider SAF to be the lesser evil as compared to SLA forces. The improved economic conditions in Tabit (good fertile land, Qatar developmental projects, etc.) may also influence locals not cooperate frankly with UNAMID field mission. ?



Mass rape

Most of the persons interviewed denied the allegation of mass rape. However, one sub- team was informed about 15 illegitimate pregnancies in the town.?The incident of an affair between a local girl and a military solider was widely reported with some discrepancies.



The disappearance of SAF soldier was also widely reported.?The detention and interrogation by SAF of the family of the girl including the girl was generally reported. Though there are important discrepancies about the number of people detained as well as the length and location of this detention.



V. Recommendations

Integrated Field Mission



• In the future to avoid delays in the reaching areas that need verification, UNAMID flight as means of transport is highly recommended to ensure timely protection of civilians.

• Delay of UNAMID fact finding mission to Tabit is due to the late government permission for UNAMID to access the area a trend that resulted in disappearing of material evidence. Thus, it is highly recommended that UNAMID should be able to move freely and as soon as possible to the affected areas without hindrance from the government authorities as SOFA stated.



[The document as I received it was a text with numbers indicating footnotes; there were no footnotes, however, and so the numbers have been removed. Nothing else in format or content has been altered in any way—ER.]



Appendix One: Below are the five instances cited in the publicly released report on UNAMID commissioned by Ban Ki-moon after serious allegations of failures to report on atrocity crimes. Ban Ki-moon in reaching his preposterous conclusion ("The Review Team did not find any evidence to support these allegations") evidently sees a distinction between "covering up" and deliberately "not reporting." UN-speak at its worst…



[1] Tawilla (North Darfur): UNAMID failed to share with DPKO a copy of the verification report on the attacks, rapes and looting at four villages in Tawilla by pro-Government forces. As a consequence and while the initial incident was brought to the attention of the Security Council, the verified findings were neither brought to the attention of Council members nor included in the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council. [all emphases have been added—ER]



[2] Kushina (North Darfur): In reporting an aggressive overflight by two Government attack helicopters, UNAMID did not report to UNHQ the verbal threat by the Government to bomb/attack the convoy from the air or mention that it was carrying an arms expert from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan. Full disclosure of the incident only came to the knowledge of the Security Council through an incident report from the Panel of Experts.



[3] Hashaba (North Darfur): There was reasonable evidence, including as reported internally within UNAMID, that members of the Border Guards were involved in this attack and went on to commit crimes and human rights abuses. This was not reported by UNAMID to UNHQ nor was there ever a public statement issued condemning the criminal action.



[4] Sigili (North Darfur): UNAMID chose not to report to UNHQ the threat by PDF members to identify and kill Zaghawas travelling in a UNAMID convoy carrying two Zaghawa villagers. The patrol returned to base only after the PDF searched the UN vehicles and began aggressive questioning of Sudanese national staff of UNAMID. The Mission reported the patrol as being aborted due to time lost at a check point, making it unable to fulfill its mission.



[5] Muhajeria Team Sit (South Darfur): There was considerable evidence and reason to believe that the fatal attack on this Team Site was carried out by pro-Government forces. A military investigation, the report of an integrated mission and the report by the Panel of Experts on the Sudan all confirm this. Although there were two attacks that night, only the second and fatal attack was ever reported publicly. DPKO described the attackers as “unidentified assailants” due to lack of certainty in the identity and affiliation of the assailants. The Government agreed to investigate, but after more than a year justice has still not been done.











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